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Background: A sentinel hospital-based severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) surveillance system was established
in Indonesia in 2013. Deciding on the number, geographic location and hospitals to be selected as sentinel sites
was a challenge. Based on the recently published WHO guideline for influenza surveillance (2012), this study
presents the process for hospital sentinel site selection.
Methods: From the 2,165 hospitals in Indonesia, the first step was to shortlist to hospitals that had previously
participated in respiratory disease surveillance systems and had acceptable surveillance performance history. The
second step involved categorizing the shortlist according to five regions in Indonesia to maximize geographic
representativeness. A checklist was developed based on the WHO recommended attributes for sentinel site
selection including stability, feasibility, representativeness and the availability of data to enable disease burden
estimation. Eight hospitals, a maximum of two per geographic region, were visited for checklist administration.
Checklist findings from the eight hospitals were analyzed and sentinel sites selected in the third step.
Results: Six hospitals could be selected based on resources available to ensure system stability over a three-year
period. For feasibility, all eight hospitals visited had mechanisms for specimen shipment and the capacity to report
surveillance data, but two had limited motivation for system participation. For representativeness, the eight hospitals
were geographically dispersed around Indonesia, and all could capture cases in all age and socio-economic groups.
All eight hospitals had prerequisite population data to enable disease burden estimation. The two hospitals with
low motivation were excluded and the remaining six were selected as sentinel sites.
Conclusions: The multi-step process enabled sentinel site selection based on the WHO recommended attributes that
emphasize right-sizing the surveillance system to ensure its stability and maximizing its geographic representativeness.
This experience may guide other countries interested in adopting WHO’s influenza surveillance standards for sentinel
site selection.
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Influenza surveillance has been instrumental in advancing
global understanding of the disease, monitoring changes
in antigenicity of different subtypes and guiding influenza
vaccine strain selection [1,2]. With the emergence and
circulation of the avian influenza A/H5N1 virus in several
countries, including in Indonesia, influenza surveillance
became a global public health priority to prepare for
an ensuing influenza pandemic. During the influenza
A/H1N1pdm09 pandemic in 2009, influenza surveillance
systems enabled monitoring of pandemic disease trends,
severity and mortality [3-5].
In July 2012, the World Health Organization (WHO)
released updated standards for influenza surveillance [6].
This guideline built on the lessons learnt from the 2009
influenza pandemic and outlined both the epidemiological
and virological surveillance objectives, as well as revised
case definitions and minimum data set requirements. The
primary objective of sentinel influenza surveillance systems
as stated in the guideline is to monitor influenza activ-
ity rather than to detect outbreaks. Sentinel influenza
surveillance systems can provide valuable information
about epidemiological trends including seasonality, age
groups affected and groups at risk of severe disease.
Sentinel systems can also provide information about
virological trends, and to identify the emergence of
viruses with unique characteristics or with antigenic
drifts or shifts [7].
As of September 2012, Indonesia had seven surveillance
systems administered by Ministry of Health (MOH) that
provided information about acute respiratory illness (ARI),
pneumonia and influenza (Table 1). Three of these systems
had hospital-based surveillance sites. Evaluations of two
hospital-based sentinel surveillance systems, the senti-
nel pneumonia surveillance system operated by the ARI
Subdirectorate since 2007 and the laboratory-based severe
acute respiratory infection (SARI) surveillance system op-
erated by the National Institute of Health Research and
Development (NIHRD) since 2006, found that both had
limited utility. Both systems had sites with very low sur-
veillance activity and the sentinel pneumonia surveillance
system lacked laboratory data while the SARI surveillance
system lacked epidemiological focus. This led the ARI
Subdirectorate and NIHRD teams to terminate these
systems in December 2012 and combine efforts to estab-
lish a SARI surveillance system in 2013 that addressed
their collective needs.
The new SARI system called ‘Surveilans ISPA Berat
Indonesia’ (SIBI) enabled the ARI Subdirectorate to focus
on the epidemiology and influenza disease control pro-
gram aspects whilst NIHRD focused on the laboratory
diagnostics. The objectives of SIBI were to monitor
epidemiological and virological trends of influenza in
different parts of Indonesia. Even though the systemmay detect cases of novel or emerging influenza viruses,
this was not deemed the primary objective of the system
as other systems such as the nationally comprehensive
Early Warning Alert and Response System (EWARS) pro-
vide such function.
One aspect that had to be considered carefully in estab-
lishing SIBI was the selection of the geographic locations
and hospitals to become sentinel sites. The WHO guide-
line highlights system stability, feasibility and representa-
tiveness as the most important factors to consider when
choosing a sentinel site [6]. The guideline also suggests
considering the suitability of sites to assess the disease
burden of influenza whereby information about the popu-
lation served by the hospital can be determined to enable
disease incidence rate calculation. When multiple sentinel
sites are being considered, WHO recommends selecting
sites that represent different population centers or climate
zones since this will provide information about trans-
mission patterns among sub-populations with unique
demographic or socio-economic characteristics. Critic-
ally, the guideline states that there is no ideal number
of sentinel sites in a country but that countries should
start with one or a few sentinel sites and only expand if
these function well.
As Indonesia is a large archipelago nation, national
decision-makers are cognizant of the regional differences
in culture, religion, economic prosperity and development
[8]. This results in a push for public health initiatives to
have representation according to administrative divisions
such as a surveillance site in each province or to apply
statistical approaches for calculation of the number of sen-
tinel sites. These approaches may not be suited or feasible
for sentinel surveillance systems where the objective is
to obtain high-quality patient level data to monitor re-
gional clinical, epidemiological and microbiological
disease trends. For example, having sentinel sites in
contiguous provinces with similar population demograph-
ics would yield more cases enrolled into the system but
would not yield additional novel information about re-
gional variation in disease activity. Similarly, having repre-
sentativeness according to population density would yield
large numbers of sentinel sites due to the size of the coun-
try but would also not necessarily capture unique regional
characteristics. Lastly, since influenza surveillance involves
costly laboratory diagnostic testing, the larger the number
of sentinel sites the more expensive the shipment and test-
ing of specimens.
Considering the guidance from WHO and the national
prerogatives, deciding on the number, location and
hospitals to be selected as sentinel SIBI sites was a
challenge. Previous studies have reported on lessons
learnt from establishing influenza surveillance systems
[9,10], but none have reported comprehensively on the
process of sentinel site selection. This study describes
Table 1 Indonesia’s nationally-administered surveillance systems for acute respiratory infections, pneumonia and influenza, as of September 2012






ARI subdirectorate Sentinel pneumonia
surveillance*
Monitor trends of pneumonia Sentinel, aggregated data 40 health centers and
40 district hospital
2007 Monthly No




Population-based, aggregated data All health centers 1983 Monthly No
Surveillance subdirectorate Early warning alert and
response system
Outbreak detection Population-based, aggregated data All health centers 2008 Weekly No
Surveillance subdirectorate Monthly outbreak-prone
disease surveillance
Trends for notifiable diseases Population-based, aggregated data All health centers and
some district hospitals#
2003 Monthly No
Surveillance subdirectorate ILI syndromic surveillance Outbreak detection Sentinel, aggregated data 20 Health Centers 2010 Weekly No
NIHRD ILI virological surveillance Influenza virus trends Sentinel, case-based 26 Health Centers 2006 Weekly Yes (influenza)
NIHRD SARI virological surveillance* Viral and bacterial trends Sentinel, case-based 10 tertiary hospitals 2006 Monthly Yes (viral and bacterial
pathogens)
MOH Ministry of Health, ILI Influenza-like Illness; SARI Severe Acute Respiratory Infection, ARI Acute Respiratory Infection, NIHRD National Institutes for Health Research and Development.
*Systems were terminated in December 2012 and resources combined to create Surveilans ISPA Berat di Indonesia (SIBI).
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were selected as sentinel SIBI sites in Indonesia. The
experience may guide other countries interested in
adopting the WHO guideline and provide an approach
for sentinel site selection or future surveillance system
expansion.
Methods
Step one: creation of a hospital shortlist
Indonesia has 2,165 public and private hospitals [11].
Before applying the WHO guideline for sentinel site
selection, we shortlisted from 2,165 hospitals to a man-
ageable number to enable detailed assessment and final
selection. To achieve this, we limited selection to public
hospitals that had previously participated in the sentinel
pneumonia or SARI surveillance systems. We ranked
these 50 hospitals in terms of two performance indicators,
timeliness and completeness of data reporting to national
level. Ranking of hospitals according to their surveillance
performance history enabled prioritization of good sites in
subsequent steps of the selection process. Timeliness indi-
cated the proportion of on-time reports received by MOH
from the sentinel site, where 100% indicated full compli-
ance with data reporting requirements (by the 10th of
each month). Completeness indicated the number of
reports made to MOH per year, where 100% indicated full
compliance (12 reports received from the sentinel site per
year). Timeliness and completeness data for the 50 hospi-
tals were extracted from the MOH surveillance system
databases. Hospitals with less than 50% timeliness and
completeness were excluded based on poor surveillance
performance history. This resulted in 20 hospitals in the
shortlist from Step One (Figure 1).Figure 1 Three-step process for SIBI sentinel site selection.Step two: application of WHO guideline
The second step was to operationalize the WHO recom-
mended attributes for sentinel site selection; stability,
representativeness and feasibility. Since influenza disease
burden has not been established in Indonesia, we incor-
porated this into the selection process.
For stability, the WHO guideline recommended calcu-
lating the funds needed to cover general costs of surveil-
lance operations for the long term. We operationalized
this by calculating the yearly costs of one sentinel site and
determining the number of sites that could be established
using funds available from MOH and donors for the
next three years. Cost calculations were based on pre-
vious surveillance system experience and included one
training for five hospital staff (2 doctors, 1 nurse, 1
laboratory worker and 1 medical records staff ), four
monitoring visits to the site, six-monthly national
meetings and costs for stationery and staff incentives.
Based on previous SARI surveillance experience, each
sentinel site was expected to generate 150 specimens
per year. Costs for specimen collection, shipment to
NIHRD and testing using real-time polymerase chain
reaction (RT-PCR) and virus isolation (for 10% of spec-
imens) were also calculated.
For representativeness, we first considered geographic
representation of the hospitals. We ranked the 20 hospi-
tals from Step One according to their geographic location
to represent west (Sumatera island, n = 5), north (Sulawesi
island, n = 4), central (Java and Kalimantan islands, n = 9),
south (East and West Nusa Tenggara islands, n = 1) and
east (Maluku and Papua islands, n = 1). For hospitals in
the same geographic regions, only the two top-performing
hospitals were kept in the list and the others excluded.
This resulted in a shortlist of eight hospitals – a number
more aligned with the resources available for the surveil-
lance system (Figure 1).
We developed a sentinel site selection checklist to
address the other attributes and criteria. This included
five questions to assess representativeness, such as the
type of hospital (general versus specialty), accessibility of
wards for influenza surveillance and the demographics
of the population served by the hospital (Table 2). For
feasibility, we included 13 questions to assess the motiv-
ation of the hospital to participate in the system, the infra-
structure and human resource capacity available for
surveillance activities (Table 2).
As stated by the WHO guideline, adequate patient
volumes and ability to ascertain the hospital’s catchment
population are needed to calculate influenza disease
burden. We added three questions to the checklist to
explore these issues. For patient volumes, we requested
data on total patient admissions not respiratory patient
admissions since hospitals may vary in their disease
coding and recording systems.
Table 2 Checklist criteria and findings from the eight hospitals visited for sentinel site selection












Feasibility 1. Hospital management agreeable to influenza
surveillance
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
2. Two surveillance coordinating doctors available Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3. Surveillance nurse available to screen patients Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4. Surveillance laboratory staff available for specimen
collection
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
5. Surveillance medical records staff available to
report data
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
6. Refrigerator for specimen storage available Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
7. Specimen courier service available Yes Yes Yes Not sure Not sure Not sure Yes Yes
8. Computer and internet access available Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
9. Frequent internet problems at hospital Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No
10. Adequate power supply for refrigerator Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
11. Back up generator available Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
12. Electronic or paper record for medical
record system
Electronic Paper Paper Electronic Electronic Electronic Paper Electronic
13. ICD 10 used Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Representativeness 14. District or province level hospital Province District Province District District District Province District
15. Hospital for all age groups Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
16. Hospital for all socioeconomic level populations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 70% low income 60% low income Yes
17. All wards can participate in surveillance Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
18. General or specialty hospital General General General General General General General General
Disease burden calculation 19. Hospital patient admissions per month 1100 576 1200 1000 240 920 1100 590
20. Patient home addresses available so that hospital
catchment population can be estimated
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
21. X-ray conducted routinely for respiratory disease
patients
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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (US-CDC)
staff were trained in the sentinel site selection checklist
objective and administration. Each team visited two hospi-
tals where the teams met with the hospital director (or
management representative), the medical and nursing staff
and the laboratory team. These hospital personnel were
targeted as they could answer the various administrative
and procedural questions in the checklist. After introdu-
cing the concept of SIBI and answering any general ques-
tions, one team member administered the questionnaire
and the others documented the answers. The teams then
toured the hospital facilities including the medical records
unit, emergency/patient admission, the laboratory and
some patient wards. This enabled visual confirmation of
the hospital capacity and likely flow of SARI patient enrol-
ment into SIBI. The teams also reviewed medical records
data on the number of monthly hospital admissions. Each
sentinel site selection visit took 4-6 hours and all hospitals
were visited in a three-week period. Funding for the senti-
nel site selection visits was made available by WHO.
Step three: analysis and selection of sentinel sites
Checklist data from the eight hospitals were entered into
a spreadsheet and analyzed descriptively (Table 2). The
four teams met to determine which hospitals would be
enrolled as SIBI sentinel sites based on the visit findings.
Hospital management motivation to participate as a sur-
veillance site was deemed a key criterion for selection as
solutions to other issues could be addressed as long as
the hospital was willing to collaborate. Thus, if hospital
management did not welcome the surveillance activity,
it no longer qualified for selection.
Results and discussion
Stability
The cost of establishing one sentinel site was USD
40,000 per year. Costs included training for five hospital
staff (USD 5,900), specimen management and testing
(USD 8,700), quarterly national monitoring missions
by ARI Subdirectorate and NIHRD staff (USD 10,100),
six-monthly national review meetings (USD 9,300) and
administrative costs such as printing forms, hospital
staff incentive payments, stationery and part-salary of a
national level data manager apportioned to one-third of
the person’s time (USD 5,580). From the MOH govern-
ment and donor funds available and projected for the next
three years, six SIBI sentinel sites could be established.
Representativeness
Based on the geographic location of the eight hospitals vis-
ited, there was representation of east (Maluku), west (North
Sumatra), north (North Sulawesi), central (Yogyakarta,
Kalimantan) and south Indonesia (West Nusa Tenggara).All hospitals were general hospitals and reported coverage
of all age-groups and socio-economic population groups,
although the hospitals in West Nusa Tenggara and
Yogyakarta reported that more than 50% of their hospital
admissions were for low socioeconomic population
(Table 2). All hospitals confirmed that surveillance
could be conducted in all wards where SARI patients
may be admitted.
Feasibility
All eight hospitals visited had five staff available for the
day-to-day operation of SIBI surveillance as well as basic
infrastructure requirements such as a refrigerator, back-up
power supply, computers and internet service for data
reporting (Table 2). Even though four sites reported unre-
liable internet service at the hospital, back-up measures
such as a WIFI modem could be utilized. For specimen
shipment to NIHRD in Jakarta, three sites were uncertain
of couriers available in the hospital vicinity. However,
based on the locations of these hospitals and the NIHRD
team’s experience, courier services were likely to be avail-
able. Two hospitals did not express willingness to partici-
pate in the surveillance system due to difficulties to
internally coordinate surveillance activities (Table 2).
Disease burden
All hospitals collected patient home addresses which
would enable estimation of the hospital catchment
population (Table 2). Six hospitals had >500 admissions
per month and two reported lower admission rates (220
and 240 admissions per month for West Nusa Tenggara
and North Sulawesi respectively). None of the hospitals
had a standard protocol mandating chest x-rays for
respiratory patients, but all hospitals estimated that 50%
of patients would have x-rays requested by the treating
physician. For surveillance purposes, the number of
patients with x-rays generated through this approach
would be large enough to enable analysis trends relating
to pneumonia. Thus, for future calculation of disease
burden of influenza in Indonesia, all eight hospitals were
considered suitable.
Conclusion
Six hospitals were selected and enrolled as SIBI sentinel
sites based on the multi-step sentinel site selection process
(Figure 1). These were the hospitals in Maluku (east),
North Sulawesi (north), East Kalimantan (central), North
Sumatra (west), Yogyakarta (central) and West Nusa
Tenggara (south, Figure 2). The lack of hospital man-
agement motivation to participate as a sentinel site was
the key reason for not selecting the hospitals in South
and West Kalimantan.
The WHO guideline was useful as it identified the key
attributes to consider in sentinel site selection and it
Figure 2 Location of six SIBI sites established in Indonesia, 2013.
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regarding the geographic representation of the surveil-
lance system. However, since the WHO guideline does
not provide an algorithm or scoring system for site
selection, we had to operationalize the attributes into
quantitative and qualitative criteria, and to prioritize
these according to our context. We also had to develop
our own approach for shortlisting from all the hospi-
tals in Indonesia to a number that could be assessed
using the detailed WHO approach.
Despite using a multi-step approach to sentinel site
selection, there were some limitations to our process.
These included reliance on self-report for checklist items
such as the hospital’s motivation to participate in the
surveillance system and availability of hospital staff to
conduct surveillance activities. Respondents may have
sought to appease the assessment team by positively
biasing their answers. To address this limitation, hospitals
ultimately selected as sentinel sites were asked to write a
formal letter to confirm their commitment to become a
surveillance site, and to list surveillance staff and their
specific role in the surveillance system. For other checklist
items, such as the proportion of respiratory disease pa-
tients receiving chest x-ray or the socioeconomic level
of the population served by the hospital, it was not
feasible to verify the answers provided by the hospital
team during the assessment visit. However, these issues
will be revisited in more detail once the surveillance
system stabilizes and disease burden can be enumer-
ated. Another limitation is that the sentinel site selec-
tion process does not guarantee good surveillance
performance. We endeavor to maximize performance
through the routine monitoring visits and twice-yearly
review meetings.
As the primary objective of SARI surveillance is to
monitor the epidemiological and virological character-
istics of influenza, surveillance does not have to be
comprehensive at all hospitals or in all provinces. A
few sentinel sites may appropriately represent the situ-
ation in-country and to inform public health officialson groups that need to be targeted for preventive and
treatment measures. To date, there have been no
studies to investigate whether influenza patterns vary
across regions in Indonesia, but since difference re-
gions have different climatic patterns and this is known
to impact influenza circulation [12,13], it is possible
that influenza patterns are different. Future studies will
be required to determine whether the six SIBI sites ad-
equately represent influenza activity in Indonesia and the
extent to which the clinical, epidemiological and virological
findings from the six sentinel sites are generalizable.
This approach may address decision-maker concerns
about surveillance representativeness in a cost-efficient
manner.
As SIBI stabilizes over time and long term resources
are assured, there is potential to enhance the system to
also monitor other important diseases such as dengue,
meningitis and severe diarrheal illness [6]. This allows
for further efficiencies in utilization of sentinel surveillance
systems for specific public health objectives and to
minimize the burden of establishing additional stand-
alone systems. The surveillance system can also be used
to evaluate the benefits of public health interventions
and to monitor disease severity and impact during a
future influenza pandemic [14]. SIBI can also be used
for emerging zoonotic diseases and allow for laboratory-
based collaborations with the Ministry of Agriculture
on diseases such as Nipah and Hendra virus or emer-
ging coronavirus infections. Overall, we hope that this
report clarifies the rationale for the geographic distribution,
the number of sites and the methods for selection.Competing interests
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